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LAW & RELIGION
NONPREFERENTIALISM IN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LAYCOCK
RODNEY K. SMITH*
The religion provision of the first amendment provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' This Article will fo-
cus primarily on its prohibition against the "establishment of reli-
gion." As I have previously argued,2 however, it is inappropriate to
separate the religious liberty provision of the first amendment into
two wholly distinct clauses, one dealing with "an establishment of
religion" and the other dealing with the "free exercise of religion,"
because the intent of the provision as a whole was, to promote reli-
gious liberty. The failure to consider the liberty-maximizing pur-
poses of the first amendment can be misleading; it is a source of
my disagreement with Professor Douglas Laycock.
Recently, Professor Laycock asserted that "history refutes one
important claim about the establishment clause-that the framers
specifically intended to permit government aid to religion so long
as that aid does not prefer one religion over others."'3 Professor
* Dean and Professor of Law, Capital University Law and Graduate Center, Columbus,
Ohio; J.D. 1977, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; LL.M. 1982 and
S.J.D. 1989, University of Pennsylvania.
I am grateful to Dan Kobil for his helpful comments on an earlier draft, and for the
efforts of my research assistant, Matt McFarland, and my secretary, Linda Rodichok.
' U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 See generally Smith, Establishment Clause Analysis: A Liberty Maximizing Propo-
sal, 4 NoTRE DAmE J.L., ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 463 passim (1990) (discussing original intent
of first amendment religion clauses).
' Laycock, The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution: "Nonpreferential"
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Laycock also impugned the historical analysis of nonpreferential-
ists-those who espouse the view that government may aid religion
or conscience so long as it does so in a nonpreferential manner. He
unequivocally declared that nonpreferentialists have "no scruples
whatever to conform their claims to the evidence."'4 Finally, Pro-
fessor Laycock objected that nonpreferentialism "does not go away
despite repeated rejection by the United States Supreme Court."'5
In this Article, I examine Professor Laycock's assertion that
nonpreferentialism lacks historical or decisional support. In Part I,
I question Professor Laycock's contention that nonpreferentialism
is inconsistent with the intent of the framers and ratifiers of the
first amendment. In Part II, I consider the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,' and demonstrate that,
contrary to Professor Laycock's understanding, each of the Jus-
tices embraced some version of nonpreferentialism.7 Finally, in
Part III, I conclude that while Professor Laycock's work is
thoughtful and certainly adds to the scholarly dialogue, his asser-
tions regarding the status of nonpreferentialism, in terms of the
case law and as an historical matter, are, at best, overstatements.
Throughout the Article, my perspective is formed by my grow-
ing concern over the Court's general misunderstanding of religious
liberty; the Justices appear to espouse nonpreferentialism as a
means of deferring to the "majoritarian" (i.e., the legislative and
executive) branches of government, rather than using nonpreferen-
tialism to further the libertarian aspirations that the framers em-
bodied in the religious liberty provision of the first amendment.
Indeed, the Court's recent retreat from the libertarian underpin-
nings of the religion provision in cases pertaining to the free exer-
cise demonstrates an alarming lack of concern for religious liberty
Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 875, 875
(1986).
4 Id. at 877.
6 Id. at 876.
6 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
7 In defense of Professor Laycock, I acknowledge that Texas Monthly was decided af-
ter the publication of his article, although it is clear that decisions rendered prior to the
publication demonstrated that nonpreferentialism is a viable theory. See infra notes 66-81
and accompanying text (discussing various views of nonpreferentialism embraced by Jus-
tices). For Professor Laycock's own analysis of Texas Monthly, see Laycock, Formal, Sub-
stantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DE PAUL L. REv. 993, 1008
(1990). In that analysis, Professor Laycock states nothing to cause me to retract my asser-
tion that Texas Monthly is based on nonpreferentialism.
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on the part of a majority of the Supreme Court Justices.8
I. NONPREFERENTIALISM: AN HISTORICAL DEFENSE
Professor Laycock has asserted that proponents of nonprefer-
entialism misapprehend the historical underpinnings of the first
amendment:
The prominence and longevity of the nonpreferential aid theory
is remarkable in light of the weak evidence supporting it and the
quite strong evidence against it. I do not mean to overstate what
we know about the establishment clause. Neither its history nor
its text offers us a single unambiguous meaning. But they can
eliminate some possible meanings, and to do that is real progress.
So long as the debate is dominated by a false claim, it is hard to
discuss the real issues.9
Clearly, Professor Laycock is arguing that nonpreferentialism is so
devoid of historical support that it constitutes a purely "false
claim" about original intent, not just a plausible but inconclusive
reading of the applicable history. Because Professor Laycock ref-
uses to admit that nonpreferentialism is one among a number of
plausible readings of the history-and the Court has taken his
view seriously 1 --, a response is in order.
At the outset, "nonpreferentialism" should be defined and
placed in an analytical framework.1 There are at least three ver-
8 See Gregory & Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not "Them"!): The Troubled Jurisprudence
of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 273 (1991); McBride, "Is Nothing Sacred?": Flag
Desecration, The Constitution and the Establishment of Religion, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv.
297 (1991).
1 Laycock, supra note 3, at 877.
10 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3099 n.39 (1989) (citing Professor
Laycock's article with approval); see also Geddicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence
of Group Rights, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 99, 169 n.322 (noting that legal scholars generally be-
ieve church-state separation concept emerged long after founding era); McConnell, The Or-
igins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1410,
1414 n.16 (1990) (historical background on establishment clause); Smith, Separation and
the "Secular": Reconstructuring the Disestablishment Decision, 67 Tax. L. REv. 955, 957
n.9 (1989) (Laycock's views are arguably "lacking in historical and textual support, and...
riddled with analytical and practical deficiencies").
11 Professor Laycock's definition of "nonpreferentialism" is not altogether clear. At one
point, he apparently defined it as a doctrinal theory that would "permit government aid to
religion so long as that aid does not prefer one religion over others." Laycock, supra note 3.
Later, however, as he discussed the sense in which those in the framers' generation may
have understood "nonpreferentialism," he noted that "'Cord correctly states that aid to all
Christians was viewed as nonpreferential in the late eighteenth century." Id. at 898. Profes-
sor Laycock may be saying one of two distinct things: (1) nonpreferentialism can be defined
1991]
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sions of nonpreferentialism. The view that government may aid or
accommodate "religion" so long as it does so in a nonpreferential
manner may be referred to as "religious nonpreferentialism." The
view that government may aid those seeking to act in accordance
with their conscience may be referred to as "nonpreference as to
matters of conscience." Finally, the view that government may aid
religion when to fail to do so would demonstrate a preference for
nonreligion may be denoted as "nonpreferentialism between reli-
gion and nonreligion."' 12
The first view seems to be the one Professor Laycock labels
nonpreferentialist. The third view, in turn, appears to be curiously
close to Professor Laycock's own preferred view-that of "perfect
neutrality"-a view that "neither encourages nor discourages reli-
gious belief or practice."1 The second view, providing for non-
preference as to matters of conscience, is my preferred view,14 al-
though I acknowledge that the general term "nonpreferentialism"
could refer to all three possibilities.
Similarly, any delineation of views regarding the meaning of
the religion provision of the first amendment might well be placed
on a continuum. At one end is the view of those who would permit
government to establish a national religion (the theocratic view)
and at the other end is the view of those who would prohibit gov-
ernment from aiding religion in any form (the strict separationist
view).
The theocratic view would permit government the broadest
power to establish religion; it would allow government selectively
to promote a particular religion at the national level. Thus, on the
as including aid to all Christian groups, but not necessarily to all religious groups; or (2) the
adulterated version of "nonpreferentialism" adopted, if at all, by the framers, does not con-
stitute evidence supporting the contemporary, broader view of nonpreferentialism among all
religions. I suspect that Professor Laycock supports the latter view, particularly because he
agrees with Professor Levy that some members of the framers' generation "tried to cover
establishment with a veneer of nonpreferentialism." Id. at 911. Therefore, I will assume that
he defines "nonpreferentiaism" as he first used it.
It is difficult to determine whether Professor Laycock was recognizing this view as non-
preferential in nature or whether he was arguing that the history did not support a broader
reading of nonpreferentialism. However, even taken in its broadest form-nonpreference
among all religions-Professor Laycock's definition of nonpreferentialism is crabbed.
12 See generally Smith, supra note 2, at 499-509 (analyzing advantages and disadvan-
tages of three versions of nonpreferentialism).
13 Laycock, supra note 3, at 922.
14 See Smith, supra note 2, at 502-06, 511 (nonpreference as to matters of conscience
view preferable because "best maximizes religious liberty").
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continuum, the point furthest to the left would be a point repre-
senting the position that government may, in its discretion, pro-
mote religion. 15 I have elsewhere argued that such a view is incom-
patible with the history of the framing of the religion provision
and, therefore, unsupported by original intent analysis.'6
Next on the continuum is a perspective developed by Justice
Story, who became its leading proponent in the early nineteenth
century.17 I have summarized Justice Story's view as follows:
[First] the people (generally, if not universally) believed that, in
adopting the First Amendment, Christianity could be encouraged
by the state, provided only that such encouragement was not in-
compatible with rights of worship of non-Christians; and [second]
any attempt "to level all religions, and to make it a matter of
state policy to hold all in utter indifference" would have met with
"universal disapprobation.""
Thus, Justice Story first interpreted the religion provision of the
first amendment to mean that government could promote a gener-
alized or nondenominational Christianity, so long as it did so in a
manner that tolerated non-Christian religions. 9 Story's view might
be broadened slightly to encompass the view that government may
promote a nondenominational religion (that includes elements of
Judaism or Christianity) at the national level.20 Thus, Story's view
15 See, e.g., id. at 487-89 (discussing position that government may promote national
religion). I do not use the term "left" to denote "liberal" in a political sense; rather, I use it
to depict a starting point on the continuum.
18 See, e.g., R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 81-85, 109-18, 208-10
(1987) (hereinafter R. Sru, PUBLIC PRAYER] (original intent was to prevent preference of
one denomination or sect over another). Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, one of the Justices
most inclined to defer to governmental power, agrees that original intent analysis precludes
the possibility of permitting government to promote a national religion. See Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Framers intended the Establish-
ment Clause to prohibit the designation of any church as a 'national' one").
7 See generally R. SArH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 107-20 (discussing Justice
Story's view on religious liberty).
19 Id. at 108 (emphasis in original).
'9 It also should be noted that Justice Story felt strongly that the promotion of nonde-
nominational Christianity would receive its primary support from the state governments. Id.
at 108-09.
20 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). In Engel, the New York Board of Regents
had commissioned the preparation of a short, essentially nondenominational prayer (but
primarily reflecting a Judeo-Christian approach) for recitation in the New York public
schools. Id. at 422. The Court held that such a prayer violated the establishment clause and
rejected a view slightly broader than Justice Story's. Id. at 433-34. It is evident, therefore,
that the Court has rejected Story's view, although some cases suggest that it might be revi-
talized. See R. SArm, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 237-60 (discussing Marsh v. Cham-
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that government may promote nondenominational Christianity can
be expanded to include some broader category of religious promo-
tion without becoming nonpreferential; it would continue to ex-
clude or discriminate against some religions and some religious
expression.
The next view on the continuum is that of nonpreferentialism.
As previously noted, nonpreferentialism may be divided into three
separate categories-"religious nonpreferentialism" followed by
"nonpreference as to matters of conscience" succeeded by "non-
preferentialism between religion and nonreligion"-each of which
progressively restricts the kind and degree of support extended by
government to religion. The final view, falling at the right end of
the continuum, is strict separationism. Under this view, govern-
ment and religion must remain entirely separate and government
may do nothing to either accommodate or aid religion, even when
failure to do so would demonstrate some preference for nonreligion
within the public sector. While it could be argued that this view is
within the perimeters set by the framers' broad intent of the reli-
gion provision,21 it has received little or no support in the pertinent
historical data.22 Indeed, as demonstrated by Professor Laycock's
"perfect neutrality" view, which is itself nonpreferential, there
seems to be some theoretical confusion between the view that gov-
ernment may accommodate religion, when failing to do so would
demonstrate a preference for nonreligion, and the view that gov-
ernment must remain strictly separate from religion and may not
accommodate religion under any circumstances. A modicum of
confusion is expected, given that the two views are immediately
adjacent to one another on the continuum of possible views regard-
ing governmental interaction with religion. However, the views
bers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-94 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (indicating that government may engage in some promotion of
nondenominational Christianity, provided such practice does not place government's impri-
matur on or endorse religion). But see County of Alleghany v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3103-
05 (1989) (indicating limited extent to which Court appears willing to permit government to
engage in such promotion of nondenominational Christianity).
21 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)
("object [of first amendment) was broader than separating church and state in this narrow
sense. It was to create a complete and permanent separation").
22 See, e.g., R. SMIrrH, PuBLic PRAYER, supra note 16, at 125-32 (discussing why Justice
Rutledge's position in Everson is weakly supported in historical record); Ingber, Religion or
Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. Rav. 233, 246 (1989)
("strict neutrality approach ... seriously impair[s] the anti-establishment mandate's effec-
tiveness" and "downgrades the positive value of religious liberty").
[Vol. 65:245
NONPREFERENTIALISM
should be separated for analytical purposes. The "neutrality view"
(which I refer to as "nonpreference between religion and nonreli-
gion") would permit government to aid or accommodate religion
when failure to do so would disadvantage religion, while strict
separationism would never allow such support.
The continuum of views regarding possible interpretations of
the religion provision, therefore, is as follows:
Governmental Story's Nonpreferentialism Strict
Promotion of View Separation
a Religion (Nondenom- Religious Conscience Religious
inational Accornmo- Accommo- Accommo-
Christi- dation dation dation
anity) Without Without Without
Prefer- Prefer- Prefer-
ence ence ence (Non-
religion)
In placing these views on a continuum, we can better understand
their interrelatedness and theoretical proximity or similarity. In
addition, we can better evaluate the various views both historically
(the goal of this section of the Article) and theoretically. 8
With this continuum in mind, we now can turn to an examina-
tion of Professor Laycock's historical analysis, in which he con-
cluded that nonpreferentialism is not defensible as an historical
matter, and therefore constitutes a false claim about original
intent.
Professor Laycock began his reasoning by asserting that the
best evidence of the framers' intent is the text of the religion pro-
vision itself. In particular, he argued that "the First Congress con-
sidered and rejected at least four drafts of the establishment clause
that explicitly stated the 'no preference' view."24 He concluded
that "[t]he establishment clause actually adopted is one of the
broadest versions considered by either House. It forbids not only
establishment, but also any law respecting or relating to an
establishment. ' '25
Professor Laycock's conclusion that the textual language of
the establishment clause seems to prohibit government from
23 See generally Smith, supra note 2, at 481-509 (discussing theoretical benefits of each
view and concluding that nonpreference as to matters of conscience view does more than
any other view to maximize religious liberty).
2 Laycock, supra note 3, at 879.
25 Id. at 881.
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adopting any law "respecting or relating to an establishment" is
ambiguous at best. Using the continuum as a contextual base, it is
unclear whether he is implying that the framers adopted a view
akin to the strict separationist view or some view more to the left
on the continuum. Indeed, without some definition of "establish-
ment," his conclusion is little more than a tautological restatement
of the language of the establishment portion of the first amend-
ment, although he added the term "relating" to the clause.
The language of the establishment clause does not resolve
matters, except to imply that the framers at least rejected the view
that the government could promote a specific religion. Professor
Laycock recognized this fact, but acknowledged that "[i]n 1791, al-
most no one thought that government support of Protestantism
was inconsistent with religious liberty, because almost no one could
imagine a more broadly pluralist state. '26 Elsewhere, he added that
if we were to adopt the framers' position, "religious groups would
be expected to quietly endure state-sponsored Protestantism. '2
Thus, Professor Laycock's assertion that the framers adopted
the broadest view (most akin to strict separation) is apparently in-
consistent with his acknowledgment that the framers seemed to
favor a view that permitted government promotion of Protestant-
2 Id. at 918. Professor Laycock is incorrect in asserting that "almost no one could im-
agine a more broadly pluralist state." Id. Madison did recognize the need for a more plural-
ist state, specifically as related to governmental respect for religious exercise. See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). Madison expressly noted that
[t]he influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular
States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other
States. A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the
Confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
secure the national councils against any danger from that source.
Id. Rives, Madison's friend and biographer, stressed that Madison argued (in conjunction
with the debates over the assessment bill, which gave rise to Madison's Memorial and Re-
monstrance) that
[a]s the benefits of the [assessment bill] were to be limited to Christian societies
and churches, it would devolve upon the courts of law to determine what consti-
tutes Christianity, and thus, amid the great diversity of creeds and sects, to set up
by their fiat a standard of orthodoxy on the one hand and of heresy on the other,
which would be destructive of the rights of private conscience.
1 W. RivEs, HISTORY OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JAMES MADISON 603-04 (1859) (emphasis in
original); see also Smith, Getting Off on the Wrong Foot and Back on Again: A Reexamina-
tion of the History of the Framing of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and a
Critique of the Reynolds and Everson Decisions, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 569, 589-93
(1984) (discussing Madison's concern for equal liberty for non-Christians, as well as non-
Protestants, in pluralistic society).
27 Laycock, supra note 3, at 920.
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ism (a view similar to that espoused by Justice Story). He at-
tempted to reconcile this inconsistency by asserting that the fram-
ers treated government-supplied financial aid to religion
differently than they did non-financial governmental acknowledg-
ment or accommodation of religious exercises.2 s Under Professor
Laycock's view, the framers failed to understand the different ways
in which they treated financial and nonfinancial aid to religion,
and, therefore, placed nonfinancial aid near the Story view on the
continuum, and financial aid at the other end, near the strict sepa-
ration view.
Professor Laycock offered three reasons why such a distinction
may have occurred: (1) opposition to taxes was omnipresent; (2)
taxes to aid churches were associated with earlier, disfavored uni-
tary establishments; and (3) the tax for churches split the Protes-
tant denominations, with the Baptists and Quakers opposing even
a nonpreferential system.29 While plausible, these speculations are
questionable both historically and theoretically.
As a theoretical matter, it is curious that the framers would
find themselves at the opposite ends of the continuum without rec-
ognizing the inconsistent nature of their positions. To reach this
anomalous result, Professor Laycock was forced to deprecate the
capacity of the framers to examine issues closely and to draw pre-
cise distinctions based on their theoretical underpinnings. I think
that he erred in reaching this conclusion. The framers were largely
natural lawyers who examined the broad theoretical dimensions of
their decisions, whereas we as interpreters are the positivists,
members of a generation inclined to examine issues in a formalistic
and specific fashion, with little regard for their broader theoretical
28 Id. at 913-18. He argued that "there were widespread objections to tax support for
churches," id. at 917, but that there was "rampant" governmental support for Protestantism
in nonfinancial matters, id. at 913. Hence, he concluded that
the appeal to the Framers' practice of nonfinancial aid to religion is an appeal to
unreflective bigotry. It does not show what the Framers meant by disestablish-
ment; it shows what they did without thinking about establishment at all. I be-
lieve that the relevant intention of the Framers is the one they thought about....
The Framers' implicit distinction was between financial aid and other aid. If both
their intentions are followed, all financial aid will be forbidden, whether or not
preferential. But unlimited financial [sic; I believe Professor Laycock intended to
use the term "nonfinancial"] aid will be permitted even if it is preferential and
coercive.
Id. at 919.
29 Id. at 917.
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implications." It is therefore strange for Professor Laycock to con-
clude that the framers could not sense the inherent contradiction
of their financial/nonfinancial aid distinction when they were far
more concerned with theoretical principles than we.
Even if Laycock is correct, I believe that there is a more plau-
sible reason for the apparent ambiguity and inconsistency of the
framers' positions: the real disagreements over theory, generally
and as it applied in various contexts, were reserved for future de-
termination by the ambiguous nature of the language of the first
amendment.3 1 Furthermore, it would seem more in keeping with
human nature to understand the framers as seeking coherence in
their views and thus moving gradually along the continuum, rather
than leaping from one end to the other, according to whether or
not government aid of a financial nature was involved.
I believe that the more likely explanation, in terms of financial
and nonfinancial aid, is that the framers largely disagreed as to
whether Story's view or a version of nonpreferentialism should
control in both areas. Given that there was some haste evident in
adopting and ratifying the first amendment, as part of the Bill of
Rights, its broad language masked such disagreement. In doing so,
the framers left the issue of which view should prevail-Story's
view or a version of nonpreferentialism-open for later genera-
tions. Masked disagreement over positions next to one another on
the continuum is more likely than masked disagreement over posi-
tions at opposite ends of the continuum. Constitutional theory, like
the common law, is more likely to move incrementally from one
position on the continuum to the next, rather than taking major
swings from one end of the spectrum to the other. Therefore, with-
out concrete evidence (none of which is offered) supporting Lay-
cock's view that the framers vacillated between ends of the contin-
uum depending upon whether financial or nonfinancial aid was
involved, it is more likely that the framers vacillated between posi-
tions that were much closer on the continuum.
It should be noted, as well, that intangible, nonfinancial aid
See generally Smith, supra note 2, at 463-78 (arguing deferential view of original
intent analysis inconsistent with framers' and ratifiers' intent to maximize liberty). It is odd,
therefore, that Laycock would disparage the framers for what I consider to be one of their
primary strengths: their capacity to comprehend broader, theoretical implications attending
their deliberations.
11 Id. Nevertheless, while the framers often masked theoretical differences with broad
language, they generally believed that they were, at a minimum, setting in motion a Bill of
Rights that would promote their aspiration for individual liberty. Id. at 466-78.
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often contains a financial aspect. Consider the following examples
of "nonfinancial" aid which the First Congress extended contem-
poraneously with the first amendment's adoption: appointing a
chaplain, supporting sectarian education on Indian reservations,
providing for religious objects on public property, and permitting
public property to be used for religious purposes.2 All these in-
stances demonstrate the specious dichotomy between financial and
nonfinancial aid. Whenever government acts, it implicates re-
sources, rendering the distinction between financial aid and nonfi-
nancial aid fairly meaningless. It strains credulity to believe that
the framers, who were so thoughtful in other areas, failed to dis-
cern the false dichotomy between financial and nonfinancial aid.
Nevertheless, to resolve my disagreement with Professor Laycock
over theory, it is necessary to examine the provision's history in
greater depth and to determine whether or not it supports Profes-
sor Laycock's assertion that the framers thought of issues related
to religious liberty in a theoretically flawed fashion.
Given the general nature of the language used in the religion
provision, and the theoretical differences between Professor Lay-
cock and myself, it is necessary to examine the accuracy of Profes-
sor Laycock's assertion that the First Congress rejected four drafts
of the establishment clause that "explicitly stated the 'no prefer-
ence' view."3 If Professor Laycock's assertion has historical sup-
port, then his position that the framers held dichotomous views
regarding financial and nonfinancial aid may well debunk the non-
preferentialism myth. If, however, the evidence indicates that the
framers used general language to veil the disagreement between
those espousing Story's view and the nonpreferentialists, his thesis
that nonpreferentialism falsely construes original intent is, then,
seriously flawed.
Professor Laycock began his analysis by noting that "[t]he
first motion in the Senate clearly presented the 'no preference' po-
sition."34 That motion, as amended, provided that "Congress shall
make no law establishing one religious sect or society in preference
to others, nor shall the rights of conscience be infringed." 5 Lay-
32 See R. SirrfH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 96-105 (identifying some "nonfinan-
cial" governmental accommodations of religion that occurred contemporaneously with adop-
tion of first amendment).
21 Laycock, supra note 3, at 879.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 880 (citing 1 DocutENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
cock acknowledged that this proposal was "first rejected, and then
passed."6 He concluded, nonetheless, that later in the day, the
Senate "appears to have abandoned the 'no preference' position, '37
with its adoption of a provision very much like the religion provi-
sion ultimately adopted and ratified. This second provision, as
adopted by the Senate, provided that "Congress shall make no law
establishing religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' s A
week later, the Senate adopted another version, which Laycock re-
ferred to as "the narrowest version . . . considered by either
House."3 " That provision provided that "Congress shall make no
law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or prohibit-
ing the free exercise of religion." 0
As I have previously discussed in significant detail, the interre-
lationship of the various provisions dealt with in the House and
the Senate debates leads to an analysis clearly reaching a different
series of conclusions than does Laycock.41 For present purposes,
however, I will focus on the weaknesses in Professor Laycock's own
analysis. Although Laycock acknowledged that the Senate first
adopted a nonpreferential position, he suggested that it later ap-
peared to abandon that view. He offered nothing other than the
variations in textual language to support this contention. He pro-
ceeded to argue further that this "rejection" of any nonpreference
view is evidence that nonpreferentialism misreads history. Laycock
asserted that the First Congress adopted a view that would pro-
hibit all financial aid to religion, although he again relied on the
ambiguous language of the ultimately adopted religion provision to
support his view.
However, the action of the First Congress is better explained
by recognizing that the predominant views of the framers were the
Story and nonpreference views, and that the framers relied on gen-
eral language to mask their disagreement, leaving selection be-
tween the views open for future determination. The framers of the
UNITED) STATES OF AMERICA 151 (Senate Journal) (L. de Pauw ed. 1972) [hereinafter Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY]).
36 Id. (emphasis added).
37 Id.
Id. at 881 (citing DocUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 35).
39 Id.
'o Id. (citing DocumENTARY HISTORY, supra note 35, at 166).
41 R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 75-96. I will dispense with rehashing that
analysis in this Article, although I am convinced that the history reveals a different series of
conclusions than those Laycock reaches.
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Bill of Rights, particularly James Madison (its author and leading
proponent in the First Congress), were anxious to get them
adopted because mounting Antifederalist opposition threatened
the Constitution as a whole. 42 Given this exigency, it is more likely
that the framers were willing to compromise on general language to
obtain a broad base of agreement between the nonpreferentialists
and the Storyites, who favored government promotion of nonde-
nominational Christianity. Such a compromise was probably struck
by proponents of two somewhat compatible views, as opposed to
being struck by two distinct groups at extremes of the theoretical
continuum. Indeed, it is quite unlikely, despite Professor Laycock's
protestations to the contrary, that the framers suddenly discarded
a view which had once commanded a majority of the Senate in
favor of a compromise between polar opposites. It is more likely
that the framers used the language's ambiguity to embody a com-
promise of more moderate views, particularly one that had already
received majority support in the Senate. At any rate, Professor
Laycock disproportionately relies on the ambiguous shifting of tex-
tual language used in the Senate, House, and Conference Commit-
tee to support his claim. He is right, nevertheless, to assert that
the framers did not "specifically intend[] to permit government
aid to religion so long as that aid does not prefer one religion over
others,"4 3 if by that he means that nonpreferentialism was adopted
to the exclusion of the Story view. While the framers may have
never specifically intended to adopt a nonpreferential view, such a
perspective is nonetheless legitimate, given the amendment's his-
tory and the framers' apparent masking of the existing disagree-
ment between those espousing the Story and the nonpreferentialist
views.
Professor Laycock also disagreed with my "speculation" that
the Senate drafts, which he characterized as "nonpreferential,"
were not in fact purely nonpreferential. In particular, he averred:
42 Id. at 77-78. Madison revealed his fears, in this regard, when he argued that the
House must quickly consider the Bill of Rights, despite the exigency of the pending judici-
ary bill. Madison stressed that
[a]lready has the subject [of consideration of the Bill of Rights] been delayed
much longer than could have been wished. If after having fixed a day for taking it
into consideration, we should put it off again, a spirit of jealousy may be excited,
and not allayed without great inconveniences.
1 ANNALS Or CONG. 731 (J. Gales ed. 1789) [hereinafter ANNALS OF CONG.]
42 Laycock, supra note 3 (emphasis added).
44 Id. at 882.
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"Smith speculates that the Senate drafts were rejected only be-
cause they would have permitted aid to a coalition of two or more
religions in preference to the rest. Reasonable construction would
have... eliminated any risk. '45 1 in fact argued with regard to the
Senate version (which Laycock claimed to be "clearly" nonprefer-
ential) that Madison, who is a nonpreferentialist, might have found
that version unacceptable because "it might not prohibit Congress
from favoring a predominant group of religious sects over some mi-
nority sect or sects. ' 46 Madison's concern with precisely that issue
is exemplified by arguments in his Memorial and Remonstrance:47
"Who does not see that the authority which can establish Christi-
anity, in exclusion of all other religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other
sects? '48  Madison understood the subtle differences between
Story's position, which was proffered as promoting only nonde-
nominational Christianity, and the nonpreferentialist position,
which would accommodate all religions equally. Madison and other
nonpreferentialists, therefore, might well have opposed the Senate
version because it leaned too far in the direction of Story's posi-
tion. Madison undoubtedly would have preferred the religion pro-
vision with its ambiguous establishment clause.49
Laycock's next major argument concerned the lack of support
for nonpreferentialism within the congressional debates over the
religion provision.5 Although noting that the "debate adds little"'"
and that "it was ambiguous concerning nonpreferential aid, ' 52 Pro-
fessor Laycock asserted:
45 Id. at 882 n.9.
" R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 87.
47 See J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1875).
48 Id., quoted in W. RIvEs, supra note 26, at 636. In the course of his Memorial,
Madison observed that "the first wish of those who enjoy this precious gift [of Christianity]
ought to be that it may be imparted to the whole race of mankind." Id. at 639. However, he
added that the assessment bill would lessen the likelihood of such conversion because the
bill "at once discourages those who are strangers to the light of revelation from coming into
the region of it, and countenances by example the nations who continue in darkness in
shutting out those who might convey it to them." Id.
41 Despite Professor Laycock's contrary contentions, the Senate version more closely
resembles the Story view (promoting nondenominational Christianity) than nonpreferential-
ism. Laycock offered no support otherwise.
50 Laycock, supra note 3, at 888-94.
Id. at 885.
52 Id. Again, Professor Laycock seems to be acknowledging, at a minimum, that the
debate was sufficiently ambiguous to leave open the possibility of nonpreferentialism.
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The heart of the argument [for nonpreferentialism] is Madison's
puzzling comments about a national religion and compelled wor-
ship. Madison's tactic was not to argue with Sylvester and Hunt-
ington [who had both argued that too strict a reading of a religion
provision might lead to results harmful to religion], but to reas-
sure them and their sympathizers by portraying the establish-
ment clause in the narrowest possible light.53
He even cited Madison's comment regarding the populace's great
fear that "one sect might obtain a preeminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel
others to conform.""' Although this was the "heart" of the debate
in the House, Laycock failed to explain why the debate did not
draw distinctions between financial and nonfinancial aid to reli-
gion. He did, however, assert that Madison's statements "are obvi-
ously inconsistent with modern interpretations of the establish-
ment clause, [and] ... with the view that only preferential aid is
forbidden." 55 Professor Laycock inaccurately and incomprehensi-
bly concluded that Madison's comments render nonpreferentialism
a false claim regarding the intentions of the framers. At a mini-
mum, nonpreferentialism remains a tenable view of interpreting
Madison's fear that "one sect might obtain preeminence" over an-
other.5 The more appropriate reading would eliminate strict sepa-
ration, rather than reject nonpreferentialism, as Laycock does.
Madison's comments regarding the fear that one or more sects
might combine together and deprive others of their religious lib-
erty-thereby denying them equal liberty-appear to offer signifi-
cant support for nonpreferentialism. At best, Laycock may prop-
erly conclude only that the debates indicate nonpreferentialism as
one among a few legitimate readings of the establishment clause.
This clause, which precludes both perspectives at the ends of the
continuum-that government may promote a specific religion and
that government must remain strictly separated from reli-
gion-seems to leave both the Story view and each of the nonpref-
erential variants intact.
Professor Laycock turned next to the debates in the revolu-
tionary states. In these debates he found intellectual historical
support for his thesis that nonpreferentialism constitutes a false
11 Id. at 891.
51 Id. at 892 (citing ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 42, at 731).
5 Id. (emphasis added).
56 Id.
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claim regarding original intent.5 1 In particular, and appropriately,
he focused primarily on the Virginia debates, which he considered
to be the "most important.15  Within the Virginia debates, he
placed particular emphasis on Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance.5 9 The Memorial was drafted and circulated to oppose the
initial adoption of a resolution that "the people of the Common-
wealth, according to their respective abilities, ought to pay a mod-
erate tax or contribution for support of the Christian religion, or of
some Christian church, denomination, or communion of Christians,
or of some form of Christian worship."60 Laycock incorrectly char-
acterized the resolution as nonpreferential. It is clear that it was
preferential in precisely the sense articulated by the Story position
because it favored support for Christianity.
Laycock asserted that Madison led the charge against non-
preferentialism and in support of no aid to religion, in the penning
of his Memorial."' He acknowledged that Professor Cord and I
have argued that nonpreferentialists, who opposed the bill on the
ground that it was preferential, may have cast some of the votes
against the Assessment Bill. He responded by asserting that such
an argument is
conceivable, but it is wholly unrealistic. It is anachronistic to view
aid to all denominations of Christians as preferential in 1786.
There were hardly any Jews in the United States at that time,
and no other non-Christians to speak of. Indeed, when it suits his
purpose, Cord correctly states that aid to all Christians was
viewed as nonpreferential in the late eighteenth century. That
some Virginians could imagine the effects of establishment on
non-Christians only shows how far Virginians had thought
through the problem.6 2
Cord may have asserted that nonpreferentialism included such aid,
but I have not, nor apparently did Madison. It is a twist of logic
57 Id. at 894-902.
58 Id. at 895.
See supra notes 47 and 48.
W. RIVES, supra note 26, at 600.
01 Laycock, supra note 3, at 897-98.
62 Id. at 898 (footnotes omitted).
63 See Smith, supra note 26, at 585-94. In the debates, Madison clearly was concerned
with "equal liberty" for all religious groups. He repeated this theme throughout the Memo-
rial and Remonstrance and his arguments in opposition to the assessment bill. Id. For a
textualist like Professor Laycock, it is curious that he would ignore the unmistakable long-
ing of the Memorial and assert that votes were swayed by strict separationist, rather than
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for Professors Laycock or Cord to acknowledge that Madison
raised issues concerning the religious favoritism of the bill, but to
argue, nevertheless, that nonpreferentialists necessarily would (al-
most mindlessly) endorse the bill. Support for the bill more likely
indicates that the longstanding opposition to the establishment of
Anglicanism in Virginia had declined in inverse proportion to the
increasing support for the Story approach as a more acceptable
substitute. Indeed, the bill was initially adopted by a vote of 47-32
(a vote attesting to the desire of many to support direct aid to
Christian churches); that support dissipated, however, when oppo-
nents argued that the bill was preferential. 4
Part of Professor Laycock's problem with the Virginia debates,
in particular, and the history of the framing of the first amend-
ment, in general, centers on his inability to distinguish between the
Story view and the various nonpreferential views. Absent recogni-
tion of this distinction, it is easy to misidentify or obscure a partic-
ular conception's placement along the continuum of possible views
regarding religious liberty and the interpretation of the religion
provision. A better interpretation of the historical facts suggests
that the definitional lines between the view that government could
aid Christianity generally and the nonpreferential view were be-
coming more refined. Certainly, one can argue that some opposi-
tion to the Assessment Bill came from those who opposed aid in
any instance, although Laycock and others offer little evidence to
support such an assertion. This "strict separationist" group, if it
existed at all, would have opposed the bill from its outset and con-
sequently could not have been the group Madison solicited for sup-
port when he circulated his Memorial and Remonstrance.6 5
When the change in terms of nonsupport for the bill grew, it
likely came from nonpreferentialists leaving the ranks of those
favoring a view similar to Justice Story's, rather than from those
who wholly opposed any aid. If so, to assert that opposition to the
Assessment Bill somehow demonstrates nonpreferentialism's in-
compatibility with original intent disingenuously overstates the
case. Rather, it demonstrates the ascendancy of nonpreferential-
ism; at the time of the dispute over the Assessment Bill, non-
nonpreferentialist or equal liberty arguments.
R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 46-49.
"' Madison would have been seeking to sway those supporters of the resolution who
encouraged equality or nonpreference in religious aid, not those who opposed any aid
whatsoever.
1991]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
preferentialism had emerged as the middle ground between Justice
Story's view and strict separationism. In addition, in disputes over
establishment issues, nonpreferentialism provided the critical bal-
ance in building voting coalitions.
The Story view, however, clearly remained quite viable in the
states at the time of the adoption of the religion provision of the
first amendment, as Laycock implicitly acknowledged: "State aid
to religion was both preferential and coercive."6 It seems at least
plausible that proponents of the view that government may pro-
mote nondenominational Christianity struck a compromise with
the advocates of some variant of nonpreferentialism. In all likeli-
hood, then, those positions provide the legitimate perimeters for
purposes of original intent analysis.
By the time the United States Supreme Court first addressed
the issue of religion in Terrett v. Taylor,'7 the Story and nonpref-
erential views had clearly set analytical boundaries. In Terrett, the
Supreme Court struck down an effort in Virginia under its consti-
tution to divest the Episcopal Church of its property. An act of
1776 had confirmed the church's rights to its lands, some of which
had been acquired as a result of financial and related assistance
received by the church when it was the established church in Vir-
ginia. In deciding the case, Justice Story stated that:
although it may be true that 'religion can be directed only by rea-
son and conviction, not by force or violence,' and that 'all men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion according to the
dictates of conscience,' as the bill of rights of Virginia declares,
yet it is difficult to perceive how it follows as a consequence that
the legislature may not enact laws more effectually to enable all
sects to accomplish the great objects of religion by giving them
corporate rights for the management of their property, and the
regulation of their temporal as well as spiritual concerns. Consis-
tent with the constitution of Virginia the legislature could not
create or continue a religious establishment which should have
exclusive rights and prerogatives, or compel the citizens to wor-
ship under a stipulated form or discipline, or to pay taxes to those
whose creed they could not conscientiously believe. But the free
exercise of religion cannot be justly deemed to be restrained by
aiding with equal attention the votaries of every sect to perform
their own religious duties, or by establishing funds for the sup-
" Laycock, supra note 3, at 916.
"7 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
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port of ministers, for public charities, for the endowment of
churches, or for the sepulchre of the dead."
Story's dicta, with its references to aiding equally "all sects to ac-
complish the great objects of religion," lends support to the notion
that nonpreferentialism was accepted doctrine.
If Professor Laycock were content to argue only that non-
preferentialism was not expressly and unequivocally adopted by
the framers of the religion provision of the first amendment, I
would agree with him. Nonpreferentialism was but one among a
few disparate views masked in the form of an apparent compro-
mise which gave rise to the language of the religion provision of
today. Eliminated from the continuum were only the view endors-
ing government promotion of a particular religion and the view
mandating strict separation (under which religion could receive no
assistance from the state).*9 Our religion clauses clearly would not
allow the establishment of a particular national religion. The ex-
clusion of strict separationism, although less clear, develops from
its relative historical weakness when compared to the data sup-
porting the Story and the various nonpreferential views.
II. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock: THE ASCENDANCY OF
NONPREFERENTIALISM IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
In addition to his assertions regarding an alleged lack of his-
torical support for nonpreferentialism, Professor Laycock has ar-
gued that nonpreferentialism "does not go away despite repeated
rejection by the United States Supreme Court." 7 Once again, Pro-
fessor Laycock has overstated his case. In its recent decision in
Texas Monthly,7 the Court strongly indicated that nonpreferen-
tialism is alive and well.
The facts in Texas Monthly are simple. Texas adopted a stat-
ute, under which it exempted from a sales tax "[p]eriodicals that
are published or distributed by a religious faith and that consist
wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and
books that consist wholly of writings sacred to a religious faith. ' 72
Thus, the case presented the question of whether the exemption
68 Id. at 48-49.
69 R. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER, supra note 16, at 56-57.
70 Laycock, supra note 3, at 876.
71 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
72 Tax. TAx CODE ANN. § 151.312 (Vernon 1982) (amended 1989).
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violated the establishment clause of the first amendment since
Texas denied a like exemption for other nonreligious publications.
The Court answered this question in the affirmative.
At first blush, it would appear that the Court had rejected the
nonpreferential view-the view that government could aid religion
so long as it did so in a nonpreferential manner. However, as previ-
ously noted in the course of constructing the continuum, there are
three nonpreferential views: (1) nonpreference among religions; (2)
nonpreference as to matters of conscience; and (3) nonpreference
between religion and nonreligion. Interestingly enough, all the Jus-
tices adopted one or another version of the nonpreference theory
as the basis for their respective opinions; the ultimately predomi-
nant view appears to have been the view that government may aid
matters of conscience, provided it does so in a nonpreferential
manner. To understand how this variant of nonpreferentialism
prevailed among the differing positions taken by the Justices, it is
necessary to examine each opinion.
Justice Brennan delivered a plurality opinion in which Jus-
tices Marshall and Stevens joined. Previously, in Walz v. Tax
Commission," the Court sustained a property tax exemption which
applied to religious properties, as well as to the property of a wide
array of nonprofit organizations. Therefore, for the plurality, the
question Texas Monthly presented concerned "[h]ow expansive
the class of exempt organizations or activities must be to withstand
constitutional assault... .," After noting that this "depends upon
the State's secular aim in granting a tax exemption,"' 5 Justice
Brennan answered the question as follows:
If the State chose to subsidize, by means of a tax exemption, all
groups that contributed to the community's cultural, intellectual,
and moral betterment, then the exemption for religious publica-
tions could be retained, provided that the exemption swept as
widely as the property tax exemption we upheld in Walz. By con-
trast, if Texas sought to promote reflection and discussion about
questions of ultimate value and the contours of a good and mean-
ingful life, then a tax exemption would have to be available to an
extended range of associations whose publications were substan-
tially devoted to such matters; the exemption could not be re-
served for publications dealing solely with religious issues, let
3 397 U.S. 664 (1970).




alone restricted to publications advocating rather than criticizing
religious belief or activity, without signaling an endorsement of
religion that is offensive to the principles informing the Establish-
ment Clause.78
Justice Brennan strongly rejected the view that government could
offer financial aid, in the form of a tax exemption, to religious
groups alone, even if such aid were offered in a nonpreferential
manner. However, he indicated that such aid could be extended to
religious groups, so long as they were part of a larger class.
Justice Brennan's opinion seems to suggest that a statute ex-
empting religious groups along with others would be constitutional
if it swept as widely as the property tax exemption in Walz; alter-
natively, a statute intended "to promote reflection and discussion
about questions of ultimate value or the contours of a meaningful
life" could appropriately include religious groups without "signal-
ling an endorsement of religion" only if the exemption extended to
"an extended range of associations whose publications were sub-
stantially devoted to such matters. '7 7 This view falls somewhere
between nonpreference as to matters of conscience and the broader
view that government may aid religion and nonreligion, so long as
it does so in a nonpreferential manner. It certainly appears, how-
ever, to be closer to the nonpreference as to matters of conscience
view. In any event, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens evi-
dently would support aid to religion on some nonpreferential basis.
In contrast, Justice White's concurring opinion curiously offers
little in terms of establishment clause analysis. Justice White ar-
gued that the exemption in Texas Monthly violates the press
clause of the first amendment.7 8 Nevertheless, Justice White joined
the majority in Walz,79 and apparently would favor aid to religious
groups or individuals on some nonpreferential basis in cases that
do not pose problems under the press clause.
Justice Blackmun wrote a separate concurring opinion in
which Justice O'Connor joined. He stated:
It is possible for a State to write a tax-exemption statute consis-
tent with both values [free exercise and establishment]: for exam-
ple, a state statute might exempt the sale not only of religious
11 Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 26 (White, J., concurring).
79 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672-73.
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literature distributed by a religious organization but also of philo-
sophical literature distributed by nonreligious organizations de-
voted to such matters of conscience as life and death, good and
evil, being and nonbeing, right and wrong.80
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor opt for the nonpreference as to
matters of conscience view. Such a view resembles the one articu-
lated by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens: a statute written
broadly to include publications about a "good or meaningful life"
might suffice. At the conclusion of his opinion, however, Justice
Blackmun enigmatically stated:
[A]t oral argument, appellees suggested that the statute at issue
here exempted from taxation the sale of atheistic literature dis-
tributed by an atheistic organization. . . . If true, this statute
might survive Establishment Clause scrutiny .... But, as appel-
lees were quick to concede at argument, the record contains noth-
ing to support this facially implausible interpretation of the
statute."1
Justice Blackmun seems to imply that merely including atheistic
groups within the ambit of the statute would satisfy establishment
clause analysis. This slides away from the view of nonpreference as
to matters of conscience and toward the view of nonpreference as
to matters of religion on the continuum. It is therefore unclear
which variant of nonpreferentialism Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor espouse-a nonpreference as to matters of conscience
approach or a nonpreference as to religion theory. At a minimun,
however, the two Justices would accept the nonpreference as to
matters of conscience view. This is particularly significant because
without their opposing votes, the Texas statute would have been
upheld as constitutional.
The dissenters, Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justice Kennedy, clearly disagreed with Justice Brennan's reading
of the Walz case. Justice Scalia, writing the dissenting opinion, as-
serted that in Walz, "[t]he Court did not approve an exemption
for charities that happened to benefit religion; it approved an ex-
emption for religion as an exemption for religion." 82 It should be
noted, however, that Justice Scalia drew a significant distinction
between direct subsidies to religion, disfavored because they divert
:0 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
8I Id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
82 Id. at 38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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income from believers and nonbelievers alike, and exemptions per-
mitted because "the state merely refrains from diverting to its own
uses income independently generated by the churches through vol-
untary contributions."8 3 Such a distinction arguably is specious;
tax exemptions could be seen as indirectly diverting money from
nonbelievers because they are forced, along with believers, to
recoup the tax revenues lost due to the exemption of religious
groups."' However, the distinction seems to carry weight in the de-
cisions and may provide some support for Professor Laycock's as-
sertion that nonpreferentialism is not supported in the case law
related to direct subsidies to churches. The subsidy cases do indi-
cate that some aid is acceptable, particularly when offered to a
class broad enough to include (1) religion and nonreligion, or (2)
some variant of aid to support matters of individual (as opposed to
institutional) conscience.8 5 Thus, while exemptions elicit different
treatment from direct subsidies, aid is nonetheless extended in
both circumstances-albeit perhaps in a manner closer to non-
preference between religion and nonreligion than to nonpreference
as to matters of conscience or religion.
However, Professor Laycock's assertion that the Court has re-
jected nonpreferentialism is an overstatement. In Texas Monthly,
each of the Justices opted for one of the versions of nonpreferen-
tialism or some hybrid of the three. The variants of nonpreferen-
tialism control much of the case's analysis. Professor Laycock has
erred in part precisely because he failed to understand the possible
variants of nonpreferentialism.
83 Id. at 43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Giannella, Religious Liberty Nonestablish-
ment and Doctrinal Development, 81 HARv. L. REV. 513, 553 (1968)).
8 See, e.g., W. KLEIN, POLICY ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL INCOtE TAX 110, 112 & 137
(1976) (examining losses attributable to tax exempt status of religious institutions).
" See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986)
(handicapped student receiving neutrally available state aid under Washington statute to
pay for religious education did not parley any message of state endorsement of religion);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398-99 (1983) (Court held first amendment not violated by
Minnesota statute providing tax deduction for education expenses regardless of whether
school was public or not, stating deduction "that neutrally provides state assistance to a
broad spectrum of citizens is not readily subject to challenge under the Establishment
Clause"); Board of Educ. of Cent. School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968)
(New York education statute requiring local public school authorities to lend textbooks free
of charge to all students including those in private schools does not violate establishment
clause); Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (first amend-
ment not violated by New Jersey statute which allocated tax dollars to pay for bus fares of
parochial school students as part of general program under which fares of pupils in public
and other schools were also paid),
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Texas Monthly is particularly instructive because it highlights
the Court's similar confusion in discerning among the three vari-
ants of nonpreferentialism. The three variants nonetheless
predominate and should be examined closely.
Given that Justice Souter has replaced Justice Brennan on the
Court, the future of nonpreferentialism is unclear. As currently
constituted, the members of the Court seem to hold the following
views: Justices Marshall and Stevens hold a weak, fairly broad va-
riant of the nonpreference between religion and nonreligion view;
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor hold a weak, fairly broad variant
of the nonpreference as to matters of conscience view; and Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy hold the non-
preference as to matters of religion view. Like Justice Souter, Jus-
tice White's view is somewhat unclear; their views may well decide
future cases. They will probably either align with Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor, or with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy, 86 having recently demonstrated some propen-
sity to do so. 8 7 If the latter, the nonpreference as to religion
view-which permits the democratic branches of government the
broadest latitude in aiding religion-may predominate. On the
other hand, should Justices White and Souter lean toward either
Justices Marshall and Stevens, or Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor, the nonpreference as to matters of conscience view
would control.
This stance can appropriately anchor establishment clause
analysis. In a prior article, I argued that the nonpreference as to
matters of conscience view better enables courts to fulfill the lib-
erty-maximizing purpose of the establishment clause.88 I argued, as
well, that such a view comports with the aspirations of the fram-
ers. "' In contrast, however, some members of the Court seem less
86 See Witters, 474 U.S. at 481 (Justice White joining in majority decision which took
conservative stance); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 388-89 (same); N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at Al,
col. 4 (Justice Souter likely to align with conservative wing of Court); Wash. Post, Sept. 10,
1990, § 1, at Al (same).
87 See, e.g., United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991) (Justice Souter
aligned with "conservative" wing of the Court-joining with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 111 S. Ct. 478
(1990) (same). But see Parker v. Dugger, 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991) (Justice Souter joined with
Justices O'Connor, Marshall, Stevens and Blackmun). Of course none of these cases dealt
with establishment clause issues; it is far too early to speculate about future alignments.
8 See Smith, supra note 2, at 502-06.
89 See id. at 510.
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inclined to base such a view on a liberty-maximizing rationale and
appear more inclined to accept it as a theoretical means of defer-
ring to the majoritarian branches of government at both the state
and federal levels.9 0 Such a movement away from the libertarian
aspirations of the framers toward a rationale permitting extensive
governmental involvement in religious matters should be cause for
some alarm.
It has long been curious to me that the current cadre of con-
servatives on the Court indirectly support government power be-
cause they willingly discount the provisions of the Bill of Rights
and emphasize theories that permit their deference to majoritarian
impulses. We should fear this movement on establishment as well
as free exercise grounds. It may portend a move by the Court to
permit extensive government aid to religion under the guise of
nonpreference, but in fact defer to the government's desires to as-
sist religions established in the mainstream and supported by a
majority of the electorate."' Indeed, the deferential shift along the
continuum might continue to the point that Story's view will
predominate because it would empower the government (i.e., the
majority) to act as it desires in matters of religion. This, regretta-
bly, would continue the Court's apparent trend to consider the lib-
erty of minority religions to be a "luxury ... we cannot afford."92
III. CONCLUSION
While Professor Laycock indulged in some hyperbole in his ar-
90 See, e.g., CNN v. Noriega, 111 S. Ct. 451, 451 (1990) (Court denied petitioner's writ
of certiorari despite strong dissent asserting trial court's ability to enjoin publication of in-
formation allegedly threatening criminal defendant's right to fair trial requires threshold
showing that suppression is only means of averting high likelihood of harm); Burnham v.
Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2116 (1990) (Court deferred to state assertions of jurisdic-
tion despite party's due process claim); Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606 (1990) ("leaving accommodation to the political process will
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but
that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred"); Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) ("government simply
could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires");
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It would come as
much of a shock to those who drafted the Bill of Rights as it will to a large number of
thoughtful Americans today to learn that the Constitution . . . prohibits . . . 'endorsing'
prayer").
" See Gregory & Russo, supra note 8, at 288.
2 Paulsen & Smith, Free Exercise After the Peyote Case: "A Luxury... We Cannot
Afford," 11 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOC'Y Q. 18, 19 (Summer 1990) (discussing Smith, 110 S. Ct.
1595).
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ticle, he thoughtfully contributed to the scholarship and raised is-
sues that deserve further analysis. In particular, I believe that he
succeeded in his effort to derail the assertion that the framers ex-
pressly intended to adopt a nonpreference view to the exclusion of
all others. His conclusion that nonpreferentialism constitutes a
false claim about original intent is overblown, however, insofar as
it is intended to debunk any historical claim whatsoever which
nonpreferentialists may have to legitimacy. Similarly, Professor
Laycock's assertion that the case law fails to support nonpreferen-
tialism is inaccurate; nonpreferentialism, of one form or another,
appears to apply to financial aid cases, though I would concede
that the nonpreference between religion and nonreligion view ap-
proximates Professor Laycock's preferred view of "perfect
neutrality."' 3
Court-watchers would benefit by examining the underpinnings
of the various nonpreference views, since nonpreferentialism is his-
" In a recent article, Professor Laycock elaborated on his theory of "substantive neu-
trality." See Laycock, supra note 7. In this thought-provoking article, Laycock highlights
three theories of "neutrality," which he defines as the requirement that the religion clauses
impose on government "to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance." Id. at
1001.
Professor Laycock seeks to distinguish between notions of "equality"-treating reli-
gions equally-and his notion of neutrality:
Is it sufficient for government to treat people equally when it imposes penalties
and distributes benefits-to treat people equally in all tangible ways? Or do we
also require government to be neutral in intangible ways as well-to be neutral in
its speech and symbolic conduct? This distinction is critical to debates about reli-
gious neutrality. I will call it the difference between equality or neutrality. When I
say government should be neutral towards religion, I mean to include the claim
that it should not express an opinion about religion. But this is a controversial
claim. Nothing in the concepts themselves will tell us whether the religion clauses
commit government to neutrality in this sense, or only to equal treatment.
Id. at 997.
Professor Laycock seems to acknowledge that neither neutrality nor equal treatment,
essentially a form of nonpreference, are mandated by the text of the religion clauses. This
implies that neither view is precluded-a position that he was earlier unwilling to take.
Despite this apparent concession, I wonder whether "substantive neutrality" adds anything
truly substantive to the nonpreference between religion and nonreligion or the nonprefer-
ence as to matters of conscience views. Laycock seems to opt for a version of the former. See
id. at 1015-16.
Professor Laycock's substantive neutrality theory does, however, focus on actual equal-
ity of impact, as well as facial equality. Establishment clause analysis in Laycock's view
must look beyond the apparent equality of treatment to its actual impact. This insight is
equally helpful for nonpreference analysis. Many times an act may appear on its face to be
nonpreferential, when its implementation, in reality, is not. I agree; the courts must look
beyond facial nonpreference to actual nonpreference or equality of impact.
NONPREFERENTIALISM
torically legitimate and is becoming increasingly descriptive of
what is occurring in the cases. As Professor Laycock noted, how-
ever, the cases involve other concerns. For example, the discussion
of coercion-i.e., whether a statute is coercive in its effect-seems
to indicate that, to some limited extent, the establishment clause
bars any aid to religion that coerces nonbelievers.94 A theory of co-
ercion, like Professor Laycock's "substantive neutrality" and the
Court's endorsement theory, may constitute helpful adjuncts to the
Court's nonpreferentialist doctrines. Such theories may help main-
tain actual, as opposed to mere facial "nonpreference." However,
while coercion may be a significant factor-indeed, it is arguable
that if aid is coercive or substantially lacking in neutrality, it can-
not be nonpreferential-it hardly maps the entire establishment
clause terrain. That terrain must include an analysis of theories of
nonpreference from an historical, theoretical, and practical (deci-
sional) point of view.
94 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 3, at 921; see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109
S. Ct. 3086, 3102-03 (1989) (Court relied on Justice O'Connor's endorsement theory originat-
ing from concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
1991]

